[Maarten Van Horenbeeck] [International Relations and Political Science]

Conflict Management approaches in Somalia

Maarten Van Horenbeeck
maarten@daemon.be

Introduction

Somalia has formally been considered a failed state since 1991. It had been governed by General Mohamed Siad Barra since its independence in 1960, but under increasing pressure in the North, after a civil war in Somaliland, the government was toppled by a coup d'etat. After this event, parts of the country were ruled by loosely related factions of warlords (Leeson, 2007).

This paper considers the situation of Somalia, from the coup in 1991 through to the situation today, and explores the conflict management approaches that have been applied in country. It makes observations and recommendations for future approaches that are more likely to be successful.

Keywords: Somalia, conflict management, spoilers, warlords

Developing a conflict map

The goal of developing a conflict map is to develop a comprehensive overview of all constraints and opportunities in which conflict management may take place. Without such overview, there is some risk that important conflict parameters are not properly understood, and a chosen conflict management approach may not be suitable for the issue at hand. For the purpose of Somalia, I chose Wehr's "Conflict Mapping Guide" due to its comprehensiveness, and its expected ability to deal well with a complicated conflict situation such as Somalia.

Conflict history

Conflict context

The Somali conflict is complex due to the existence of a varied number of parties, which each have different impact in specific regions of the country. For instance, the Juba Valley Alliance focused mainly on an area known as Jubaland, whereas Al- Shabaab is a much more national participant in the conflict (Browne and Fisher, 2013). Browne and Fisher note that clanism is an important aspect of Somali political calculations, noting over twenty actors with strategic influence in the country. Given the presence of several warlords, interests are equally diversified, but are mostly focused on territorial control. There are a number of tangential interests

which influence participant behavior, including religion. For instance, al-Shabaab, an important national actor, has as strong goal to establish an Islamic administration (Roque, 2009). Finally, there are interesting differences between the conflicts from a geographical perspective. Southern Somalia has not seen the same degree of regional state building as the North, and has seen more conflict on average due to conflicts with neighboring Ethiopia and the more unified Transitional Federal Government (TNG) entering from the North (Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh, 2008). Hence individuals in the South would benefit more from the development of peace, than those in the North.

Conflict Parties

Primary

The complexity of conflict in Somalia means that there are numerous parties to the conflict, including Al-Shabaab, the Transitional National Government, the Juba Valley Alliance, the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council and the Somali Patriotic Movement. Browne and Fisher identified over twenty individual actors (2013). Some of these, though, are more appropriately described as criminal groups, as they focus on conducting piracy operations, rather than being party to internal conflict. As direct participants in conflict, they see Political actors, Militia and Civil society and non-state actors. Political Actors are organizations that have participation in the political constitution of the country- such as the Transitional Federal Government

and the governments of the independent areas of Somaliland and Puntland. While the interests of these organizations do not converge, they are generally placed in opposition to the Militia, such as al-Shabaab and Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama (ASWJ), which do not formally own territory, but represent their own fraction and control large portions of Somalia.

Secondary

Secondary parties to the conflict include Somalia's private sector and civil society, as well as several criminal enterprises that benefit from the conflict, such as piracy groups operating along the coast. Both of these types of individuals and organizations either benefit or suffer from the changing dynamics of peace and violence, sometimes in unexpected ways, as this paper will cover later.

A second set of secondary parties include the countries of Ethiopia and Egypt, which have both participated in peace building operations, and have some interest in ensuring either security or instability.

Interested third parties

A number of interested parties exist, which are not directly involved in the conflict, but have attempted to mediate. These include the African Union and the United Nations.

Issues

Facts-based issues

The main facts-based disagreement in Somalia is based on land- given a large number of warlords; there is interest on behalf of each party to expand its control over territory.

Values-based issued

Religion is a strong driver behind the activity of several parties to the conflict, in particular the militias, of whom both al-Shabaab and ASWJ pursue an Islamic state.

Interests-based issues

Somalia is not a resource-rich country, and the conflict is only remotely related to resources. Le Billon (2001) found a distant relationship between resources, in particular bananas and camels, and conflict, compared to close relationships between e.g. gas in Algeria.

Nonrealistic issues

Freeman and Fisher describe Non-realistic issues, as used by Wehr, as "originating in interaction, communication or discomfort". A brief literature review shows that due to tribalism, there are differences between how participants to the various peace processes approached the negotiations, and how they developed their own internal negotiation structures. Some participants had very centralized power

structures, where one particular negotiator had significant power to make decisions on behalf of his group, as is the case with militias, while other groups where represented by elders who would conduct a separate negotiation with their constituency. This form of decision-making system could be considered a non- realistic issue of governance.

Dynamics

Precipitating events

Elmi and Barise (2010) describe how at its inception, the country of Somalia was divided into a five-part colonial state, governed by Britain, Italy and France. They quote the Somali poet Hadrawi, who argues "the colonial powers destroyed Somalia's socio-economic system".

Both authors note that a Somali will generally refer to himself as the member of a particular clan. Community leaders will leverage the claims to grievances of any participant clan as needed to mobilize their resources (Elmi and Barise, 2010). After the coup d'état in 1991, government was essentially taken over by these local fractions, rather than a unity government at a national level.

Issue emergence, transformation, and proliferation

Hohne (2006) describes how after the collapse of the national government, different administrations emerged. Some of these had some level of state structure, such as Somaliland and Puntland, whereas the south did not have these structures. He notes this as a first adversarial issue within country that was likely to lead to violent conflict.

In the South, a conflict around territory developed shortly thereafter. This conflict is centered both along religious lines- with a number of parties wishing to develop an Islamic state, including al-Shabaab (Roque, 2009), and a number of parties, mostly warlords, being interested in the extension of their land (Besteman and Cassannelli, 1996).

Finally, a third conflict emerged between those wishing to develop a national government, and all other parties. This group includes the Transitional National Government. Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh quote its president, Abdillahi Yusuf, "It is totally misguided not to accept the government. The alternative is chaos". But in chaos, thrive the other parties.

Polarization and spiraling

It is clear that each of these groups favor mutually exclusive outcomes, which explains the lack of success in national conflict management. There are also indications that parties leverage peace processes to attempt to solidify their own position, and attempt to gain deeper legitimacy- furthering the polarization of these points of view. Menkhaus (2008) notes a proposal by General Aideed of the Somali National Alliance political fraction to provide national reconciliation. However, he purposefully aimed at generating a government with SNA constituencies alone, excluding other tribal groups, as well as Somaliland and Puntland. While this attempt at legitimization was ultimately unsuccessful, it shows the ongoing attempts of parties to solidify their own power and distinguish themselves from other actors.

Stereotyping and mirror-imaging

There was little evidence in literature that stereotyping happened to a great degree between fractions in Somalia. However, this could be related to the lack of legitimacy that many leaders had within their own communities. In particular the warlords did not engage with their communities at the level of building strong narratives for the existence of their clans, rather they chose to focus on projection of power and attainment of resources.

Conflict regulation potential

Internal limiting factors

While it would be expected that most organizations would benefit from peace, the so-called "peace dividend" (Knight, Loayza, Villanueva, 1996) this is not necessarily the case. This appears to be the case for both legitimate, and illegal practices:

Shortland, Christopoulou and Makatsoris (2013) flag how particular areas of the country, including the major hubs for the World Food Programme, actually benefit from increased conflict in other parts of the country. Introduction of more foreign aid increases the local economy and reduces the incentive for these areas to contribute to the peace building process.
Browne and Fisher (2013) note that "conflict and disorder in Somalia have created the enabling conditions for piracy". They flag that piracy operations are tied to individual clans. Clans involved in piracy operations will be less inclined to contribute to peace building efforts.

External limiting factors

A number of external factors also limit the ability to reduce conflict. The major ones are an overall lack of interest from major powers, and a troubled overall peace policy from the neighboring state of Ethiopia:

While UNOSOM initially seemed to indicate an interest on behalf of the United States, after the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops, interest has been limited in re-engaging in widespread peacekeeping operations. Somalia does have some limited oil resources, but most of these are located in the relatively stable Northern area of the country, in particularly Somaliland (Mubarak, 1997). The interest in achieving stability in the resource poor South is mostly domestic or due to humanitarian interests;
Elmi and Barise (2010) flag that Ethiopia historically "welcomed and armed all opposition groups fleeing from the repression in Somalia". The understanding that Ethiopia has the ability and history of undermining state building resources in Somalia is a significant blocker from any hard action against either militant groups, or the development of domestic controls on violence. Its ability to backdoor any agreement also shows the importance of Ethiopia gaining the trust of civil society in Somalia, should any form of peace agreement be reached.

Techniques of conflict management

Conflict management in the Somalia case has been very much focused on reconciliation between the various groups at both a national and regional level. Menkhaus (2007) identified that between 1991 and 1995, there were a total of "17 national-level and 20 local-level reconciliation initiatives". Most of these events were developed as peace conferences, constituted with local, national or international support. Menkhaus notes that at the regional level, success was often found, but this was less the case when it comes to national reconciliation.

At the harder end of the spectrum, in 1992, a military intervention took place by the United Nations, under the moniker UNOSOM. This intervention saw a wide split in organizations delivering humanitarian aid, where it was strongly supported by several NGO's, including CARE International, and heavily criticized by others, such as MSF and Save the Children UK (Slim, 2001). While UNOSOM ended in a UN withdrawal from the country after a helicopter crash (Stupart, 2011), some observers believe it destabilized the existing control of militia and did create room for local peace building initiatives (Crocker, 1995).

Reviewing these techniques in the context of Ramsbotham and Schellenberg's (2011) conflict management typology, we can see that the general approach of meeting and driving reconciliation are focused at the consolidation and resolution approaches, while military intervention was used at an early stage as an approach to containing and regulating violence.

It should be noted that many of the peace conferences actually had aspects of conflict transformation embedded- the development of institutions. Given the tribal nature of Somalia's politics, many of the more successful conferences incorporated the Somali assembly structure. Menkhaus (2007) notes how a communal conference incorporating this structure, combined with an on-the- ground presence directly with community stakeholders, led to the Jubbaland Peace Accord, which addressed armed conflict over Kismayo, a port city in the Jubba Valley.

Attempted conflict management approaches

A number of conflict management approaches have been trialed in the case of Somalia. In particular (Menkhaus, 2013) 17 national and 20 sub-national peace conferences have taken place, with varying degrees of success. There are two specific learnings from previous efforts. It is noteworthy that attempts to build peace at the regional level have been much more successful than building peace at the national level. In an attempt to move from these smaller successes to a national success, Ethiopia attempted to integrate existing regionally successful governments such as Somaliland and Puntland into the federal system. This attempt was unsuccessful as the clans controlling the capital city had very little affinity with these regional governments (Menkhaus, 2013).

Considerations and constraints

Three particular constraints and considerations stood out while analyzing the case. First of all, there was significant bias and hidden agenda in most of the outside mediators. Menkhaus (2013) notes how Ethiopia may not be fully committed to a strong Somali state, and how the UN pulling out of Somalia in 1995 is also not indicative of a full commitment.

Second, war economies result out of a "state of war which provides opportunities for personal financial gain" (Shortland, Christopolou and Makatsoris, 2013). Some actors, which are often powerful, may benefit more out of a persistent situation of conflict, rather than situations of peace. Shortland, Christopolou and Makatsoris show this by illustrating that when war was at its gravest in some of the southern areas of Somalia, the economy in the North was boosted by an increasing influx of foreign aid. Webersik (2006) flags the trade in "quat", a local drug, as another symptom of the war economy- a trade which would be more difficult to conduct in a peaceful society.

Finally, the complete lack of a formal state structure has significant impact on the success of mediation efforts. Menkhaus (2013) identified how in most conflict management situations, there is at least some state structure that can support or be a party to negotiate these efforts. Representation is clearly an issue, and it is not always clear who speaks on whose behalf.

These three elements each had some impact on the overall conflict management process which was applied. It is clear that there was a significant lack of trust of process participants in any outside mediation. There were valid reasons of concern, which led to even deeper distrust and as Menkhaus notes (2013) the creation of conspiracy theories. The withdrawal from military intervention also showed a lack of commitment on behalf of the United Nations, further deteriorating trust.

The development of war economies logically grows over time as international support starts flowing in. As the economies become more "settled", positions appear to become more entrenched, and over time modifying the economy to position benefits as part of a peacetime economy is likely to become more laborious.

The lack of a formal state structure is most visible in the large amount of peace conferences conducted. Menkhaus (2013) shows how most conferences had slightly different models of conduct- either bringing together warlords, civil society or tribal elders. This process needed to seek out the configuration which would result in most success. When some level of governance is available, the most likely option is to support the existing governance model and help build capacity. It is clear this was attempted, but Menkhaus (2013) states that the national conferences "were the most widely publicized, and ultimately least successful of the reconciliation efforts". He notes that the Transitional National Council lacked legitimacy in its own community.

Alternative conflict management approaches

The main learning from previous conflict management approaches is the lack of consolidation prior to engaging in transformative and resolution efforts. Most parties either appeared to lack legitimacy, or were mostly focused on the expansion of their own territory, rather than on state building amongst their constituency.

Alternative approaches which could have been taken include:

The consolidation of regional economies first, followed by the encouragement of trade between fractions, and the development of peace through reducing the incentives for violence, and increasing the opportunities of domestic and international trade. This scenario would focus on conflict reduction at the local level, the development of local institutions that can encourage and engage in trade relationships, and finally the development of ties between the local, regional and national levels. This approach would likely have worked well for relationships between relatively stable regions such as Somaliland and Punt land. However, it is likely certain regions would stabilize at a slower rate than others, and economic incentives would still be inclined towards violence- the "grab territory" option will still appear more appealing than the slower development of trade, and potential influence of commercial competition;
Mediators could move the conflict from being interest-based to identity- based. This would be an application of the ARIA model (Rothman, Olsen, 2001). Rothman and Olsen describe that their model in particular divorces the conflict from state-centric approaches to resolution, which would appear applicable to the Somali context. However, it does make the assumption that the conflict is rooted more deeply rather than simply economics and interests. There is some sign that at least part of the reason for the conflict in Somalia is deeply rooted in these latter two components, and that an identity based approach may only be successful for specific participants which are already active at the political level- but not the warlords and clans with strong interests in the existing situation.
A third possible approach is rooted in what Elmi and Barise (2010) describe as the third most important factor prolonging the conflict, outside of the warlords and Ethiopia- a lack of resources, or capacity. They describe the dependence of the country on foreign assistance, and its lack of internal capacity at various levels, including state institutions. A transformation approach could involve the development of these domestic resources in partnership with a select group of conflict parties. This would likely need to exclude warlords and more violent clans, or delegate them a symbolic role only, given their continued benefit from domestic conflict. It may also need to implement guarantees for warlords, as many feel "uncertain about their future" (Elmi and Barise, 2010) in the case of a peaceful conclusion of conflict. To a degree, this approach has already been attempted, but has been unsuccessful, mostly due to a lack of trust of the population and conflict parties in the implementing foreign institutions, and continued violent action against this level of stabilization.

Any solution likely to result in an end to conflict, and the beginnings of national reconciliation in Somalia would be rooted in a combination of the first and third approaches- stabilization and institution building at a regional level, combined with a focus on realigning economic incentives.

Conclusion: the pitfalls and potential conflict management approaches in international relations

The case of Somalia, which is complex and multi-faceted, with not merely two parties, but a wide list of characters and diverging interests, is a unique example to evaluate, at a high level, a number of elements in international relationships and their impact on conflict management. These include:

Economics: for any conflict management approach to succeed, economic incentives must be aligned with peace. When a conflict management methodology does not address a significant party benefiting from the situation of lawlessness and violence, it will likely fall short;
Security interests: both at a domestic and international level, security interests are important to success. The history of Somalia includes several clear examples of negotiations not succeeding due to security concerns of participants in the negotiations, or even violent action to undermine an ongoing negotiation.
Legitimacy: numerous attempts at conflict management took place without any form of legitimacy, purely based on the "power" of a violent actor. None of these were successful, as these particular warlords chose the development of their power over stabilization.
Culture and ethnicity: negotiations were significantly more successful when they embedded aspects of local cultural power building, such as tribal and community groups, rather than formal, "alien" organizations which did not take into account local sensitivities, such as formal meetings.

At an international level, the events in Somalia also underwrite the need for organizations to "build trust", and ensure their own incentives are aligned with peace, prior to engaging in formal conflict management.

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