[Maarten Van Horenbeeck] [International Relations and Political Science]



A backgrounder on the ASEAN Regional Forum

Maarten Van Horenbeeck
maarten@daemon.be


Introduction

This paper reviews the ASEAN Regional Forum, or ARF, an intergovernmental organization operating under the auspices of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations. It reviews the structure of ASEAN, its dominant criticisms, and to what degree, in support of liberal and constructivist thought, it contributes to security within Asia Pacific. Prior to addressing the ARF, it investigates how intergovernmental organizations generally fit into international relations theory.

Keywords: Southeast Asia, ASEAN, ARF, constructivism, international relations theory

International Relations Theories and the role of IGO's

Intergovernmental organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum are an odd element of the international community. Conventional realism saw no place for them, seeing individual states operating at the highest level of autonomy and international politics, within an environment of anarchy. In the liberal school of thought, though, room for international organizations started to grow.

Doyle notes that "neither the logic of the balance of power nor the logic of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance- liberal principles and institutions" (Doyle, 1986). He describes Emmanuel Kant's argument that perpetual peace can be guaranteed through the acceptance of a universal treaty of peace, requiring republican states, a pacific federation which safeguards the rights of individual states, and finally, a collective security agreement.

Kant's liberal internationalism recognized a place for a form of governance over individual, autonomous states, in which these states gave up a small part of their autonomy in exchange for certain guarantees from the international community.

The main intergovernmental organization to arise in safeguarding international security was the League of Nations, an initial experiment at preventing war, which lasted until the end of World War II, when its role was taken over by the United Nations. The League of Nations also showed that it was not enough to have an institution- structure, powers and participants also mattered. In the words of Louis

Pauly, "In the wake of the war it was designed to prevent, the League became the example to be avoided in building new multilateral institutions" (Pauly, 1996). The value of intergovernmental organizations deepens strongly in the context of neo-institutionalist and regime theory. Douglas North described institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North, 1990). He sees organizations as groups of individual players that want to achieve institutional change- in other words, change the rules of the game. This implies that an institution requires wide acceptance by a larger set of organizations and individual states, and its rules must be accepted by this larger set of organizations. Duffield (1992) investigated NATO and found that NATO did have an effect on stability in the Central Region of Europe, which could not be explained purely with balance-of- power theory and public goods theory. Though he did recognize limitions, he could clearly state that "regimes do matter. They can have a significant degree of influence on state behavior" (Duffield, 1992).

Following Checkel's (1998) view of social constructivism as a method, rather than an international relations theory, intergovernmental organizations are a consequence of norms and ideals growing out of national interests. He sees agents, such as states and decision makers, agree on a specific set of norms, which then become institutionalized against the backdrop of intergovernmental agreement. While his views do not necessitate actual organizations such as IGO's or non- governmental organizations (NGO's) supporting these norms, it is a logical continuation of constructivist thought that these processes are formalized.

Constructivism thus ends up being a valuable tool to work back from an intergovernmental organization, and understand why it came to be.

We can thus see significant backing for the role of intergovernmental organizations in most of today's prevalent international relations theories. Even neo-realists such as Waltz have slowly warmed to a role for these organizations, be it at a more practical level- and seeing them as leverage supported by a number of states to accomplish a particular balancing goal. For instance, he describes NATO in the light of "a set of guarantees given by the United States to its European allies and to Canada" (Waltz, 1979) as opposed to a multinational military and political partnership with redeeming factors outside of America's military might.

Whether an international agreement to provision security, an organization which sets norms for a number of member states, or a military balancing act against a common aggressor, it is clear that international organizations have the ability to serve a number of interesting roles in all but strictly realist thought.

Given the ARF as an organization supports security in Asia, it is also important to consider how this it may fit into regional thinking- none more important so than in Chinese political thought. Evans (2003) evaluated how an international organization such as the ARF fits into a material theory of Chinese foreign politics, the "Sinic zone of influence". She describes the Sinic zone system as a constructivist view incorporating realism, a "mandate from heaven" granted to China, and a strong need to avoid internal strife and external threats. This "mandate from heaven" allows China to both participate, and avoid participation in the international community depending on its long term, "mandated" outcomes.

The ASEAN Regional Forum

The ASEAN Regional Forum grew out of mounting suggestions by Australia and Canada at the 1990 ASEAN Forum, that Asia needed its own implementation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Heller, 2005). The CSCE, which as of 1995 became known as the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, was a loosely structured conference of states, aiming to work towards a "comprehensive concept of security that derives from commitments by the participating states on a broad range of political, military, human rights, economic and scientific issues" (Shapiro, 1995). These commitments were political in nature only, and could not be legally enforced, making the organization acceptable to most, and ensuring wide participation across Europe.

Dobson describes how the ARF was finally established in Singapore, at the 4 th ASEAN head of government meeting in 1993. At its inaugural meeting, in 1994, the first ARF chairman stated its objectives as: The ASEAN Regional Forum counts 27 countries amongst its members, of which 18 were founding members. It includes all 10 ASEAN member states, 10 ASEAN dialogue partners, one ASEAN observer, as well as North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, who are not participants in ASEAN. It has a low level of institutionalization, and does not have its own secretariat nor staff. Instead, the chairing government organizes all events in partnership with other member states. (DFAT, 2014).

The original ASEAN Regional Forum concept paper set out three stages of development for the organization. It would initially focus on the promotion of Confidence-Building measures (CBM's), subsequently developing its own mechanisms for preventive diplomacy. Finally, it should hold as an eventual goal to develop conflict resolution capability, though the concept paper itself holds that "it is not envisaged in the immediate future" (ASEAN, 2014). Heller assesses that the ARF is currently somewhere between phases 1 and 2, but no development has been made on the basic requirements to develop conflict resolution capabilities.

The organization is an example of two-track diplomacy: it consists of a truly government track, which Heller (2014) notes organizes four events: The second track is a meeting of the informal academic sector, involving scientists, experts and officials. ARF (2014) describes the role of track two as a partnership between "strategic institutes and non-government organizations in the region." In order to increase its relevance, it notes that track two activities must focus on the current concerns of the ARF, and the synergy of both tracks would contribute to development of the confidence building measures. Heller notes that there is some overlap between participants in Track two and Track one activities, which is regarded as positive, as it helps move discussion along more quickly.

Sharpe (2003) and Heller (2005) both note that the ARF was modeled after the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way is a unique approach to institutionalization which takes a strongly principal-based, non-legalistic approach to intergovernmental discussions. Goh (2002) describes these as "the principle of seeking agreement and harmony, the principle of sensitivity, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability, the principle of quiet, private and elitist diplomacy versus public washing of dirty linen, and the principle of being non-Cartesian, non-legalistic."

According to Heller, these norms contribute to the development of a "shadow of the future" on current discussion between ARF participants. He notes it allows for repeated interactions, which game theory will guide towards the development of a less volatile long-term relationship. He also finds that the ASEAN Way lowers transaction costs per interaction more than a legalistic system of agreements, treaties and enforcement.

Constraints and difficulties for the ARF

Heller (2005) identifies a number of constraints that the ARF faces:

He notes though, that despite these limitations, the proof of the ARF's success is in the pudding: despite several major strategic differences between ARF members, there is currently no notable "open war" on the continent. The way he believes the ARF works, is by developing itself into a "self-intensifying process". Though no legal ramifications exist for not taking part in commitments made in the ARF, the political cost of doing so continuously increases.

Lim (1998) does not share his view. He sees the ARF as a balancing exercise against the power of the People's Republic of China (PRC) within Asia, and notes "the lesson of security in Europe during and after the Cold War is that multilateralism cannot work when the source of the strategic tension is inside the tent". This takes a very strong realist view, seeing the ARF not so much as a way of intensifying and deepening relationships, and dependencies, but as a simple way of Asian states to balance against the power of China.

Contemporary strategic tension and the ARF

The ARF has shown to be responsive to immediate security concerns. On its site, the ARF notes that it does not shy away from sensitive topics- it illustrates this by stating that at its first meeting, it addressed the Korea question. However, it should be noted that this took place prior to North Korea taking part in the forum as of 2000. One example of an immediate response is the organization of Australia and Singapore in June 2003 of an ARF workshop on managing the impact of a terrorist attack shortly after the Bali bombings of October 2002 (Haacke, 2009). Haacke notes similar examples from counter-piracy and disaster response, but also notes that most non-desktop exercises have been organized by a small set of members of the group, mostly Singapore, Australia and the United States.

Lim's view of seeing the ARF as only slightly beyond a balancing exercise is of interest, as China does play a disproportionate role within the region's security tensions. Evans (2002) aimed to explain China's increasing participation in the ARF, having originally preferred a more closed, bilateral approach to addressing security tensions.

She finds that from western international relations theory, and realism in particular, the behavior of China is difficult to explain. However, in her view, Chinese realism "made up of the Confucian and Legalist schools of through of ancient China which have dominated Chinese thinking on inter-state relations for the past 2000 years, and continues to play a role in Chinese thinking today, is based on viewing the system as a whole, tianxia". In this sense, she finds that it is "not out of the question that the PRC will not change its views on international security cooperation", and that participation in the ARF "enables China to change while actively fashioning the world in her own image".

If indeed China is acting according to its own realist concept, then the impact of the ARF and its actual value in preventing open conflict in Korea and Taiwan, and to a lesser degree in any of the territorial disputes involving China, such as the Spratley islands, the Parcel islands and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands will be interesting observation. As the ARF currently has no conflict management ability, its deterrent would be dependent on its "shadow of the future": a breach of the ARF values may result in reduced trade or international sanctions, but is unlikely to lead to an ARF or ASEAN-led force coming to the rescue of an imperiled member.

Garofano covers both of these views well, when he states that constructivists are optimistic that the ARF contributes to progress toward a "security community", yet structural realists contend that "the ARF is mostly irrelevant to the region's main security issues, the future of which is determined by power and states' overriding concerns for their own security".

Conclusion

The rise of the ASEAN Regional Forum within Asia as a center for the discussion and settling of regional security issues is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First of all, strategic tensions are common in the region, yet it manages to get widespread participation both from within and outside of ASEAN. Second, it has proven to be a valuable tool for the region in responding to immediate security issues, mostly on those topics that are less controversial, such as terrorism and piracy. While the lack of events is not per se evidence of success of mitigation, it is also noteworthy that no open war has taken place on the continent during its time.

It is however clear that the ARF, twenty years beyond its inception, has not managed to work on preventative diplomacy, and in particular move onto developing conflict management features. Given the level of strategic tension in terms of territorial disputes and latent war (Korea), these should be priorities for the organization. It appears these are more difficult to tackle given regional interests. The use of two- track diplomacy allows for the open discussion of topics that may be too sensitive for discussion directly between affected heads of state, and creates a helpful forum for security debate in the region. Hopefully this part of the organization will aid in moving these topics along.

From a theoretical point of view, the ARF makes an interesting organization, as it is not the security treaty organization Kant had envisioned. However, it fits in well with a social constructivist view on intergovernmental collaboration, developing a set of common values and methods, leveraging those to discuss otherwise difficult to address topics. While it does not necessarily resolve conflicts through clear agreement, each iteration of discussion entrenches the relationships between ARF members, making it more difficult for one to abandon the organization's values by engaging in outright conflict.

A key question which remains to be answered is how well a forum which values inclusion, deepening of relationships and self-intensifying discussion, will fare in a region where realist, geopolitical concerns are strategic concerns. Its correlation with the lack of war is interesting, but as these tensions grow, observing the ARF will be an interesting endeavor.

Reference list

ARF, 2014. "About the Asian Regional Forum" (2014). Retrieved April 10 th , 2014, from http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html.

DFAT, 2014, "ASEAN Regional Forum" (2014). Retrieved April 10 th , 2014, from https://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/.

ASEAN, 2014, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper". Retrieved, April 11 th, 2014 from http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Terms%20of%20Refere nces%20and%20Concept%20Papers/Concept%20Paper%20of%20ARF.pdf.

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