[Maarten Van Horenbeeck] [International Relations and Political Science]
European migration flows: Algeria to France
Maarten Van Horenbeeck
maarten@daemon.be
Introduction
This essay reviews the impact and policy solutions applied to migration from Algeria to France. It evaluates causes over time, with particular attention to the period after which labor immigration was no longer directly desired nor encouraged by the French government- post-1973, and in which time it could be assessed as a "forced" migration. The paper will focus on impacts of migration, and aim to determine visible effects such as return migration.
Keywords: migration, Algeria, France, return migration, forced migration
Scoping the immigration flows from Algeria to France
France has historically been the largest migration destination for Algerians. According to the United Nations "Trends in International Migrant Stock" (UN, 2013) in 2013, 1,406,845 of France's total of 7,439,086 migrants was of Algerian origin, or about 18.9%. In 2000, that number was 839,920 out of 6,278,718, or 13.4% and in 1990, 788,914 out of 5,897,267, still about 13.4%. The female component of the Algerian migrant community also appears to be relatively high. In 2013, women made up 45.7% of the community, whereas in 2000 and 1990 this number was 44% and 43% respectively.
In neoclassical terms, this can be explained by immigration laws which changed and allowed for family reunion. During the 50's and 60's, migration from Algeria to France was predominantly male. This changed in the 1970's, when family reunion became a larger portion of all migration. The proportion of women in the Algerian community in France quickly rose from 10 to 30 percent. (Collyer, 2003a).
However, the continued rise of the percentage, resulting in more women immigrants than men, may also be tied to other causes, such as ongoing violence and civil war in Algeria.
Immigration from Algeria to France is rooted in France's colonial history. A French colony from 1830 through 1962, Algerians were, from the French side, allowed to freely migrate between their home country and France from 1946 until 1984 (Collyer, 2003a). As for the Algerian government, it unilaterally decided to stop outward migration in 1973, ending a large emigration wave (MPC, 2013). MPC does note that from 1994 through 2007, emigration towards France doubled yet again, as well as flows to Spain and Canada.
The last major migration flow appears to be in response to a violent civil war, which has affected the country since 1992, resulting in over 100,000 deaths by 2002, as well as a near-total collapse of democratic and legal processes (Silverstein, 2002).
Technically, many of these individuals did not leave their home country for reasons of "persecution", the definition for refugees under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention: "is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." (United Nations, 1967). However, they would have significant reason to feel "forced" to leave Algeria due to ongoing fear of instability and violence. In 2003, there were a total of 2,124 asylum seekers from Algeria who applied for legal admission into France (ICAR, 2004).
Outside of regular immigration and asylum seekers, there is also an issue related to undocumented, or irregular immigration. While the exact number of immigrants staying in France in such way is unknown, numbers between 200,000 and 400,000 were regularly quoted over ten years ago (Economist, 2002).
Algerian migrants: an example of transnationalism
In any migration flow, an important question is why the flow initially started to take place. Macro theory mostly explains these movements from a neoclassical economic perspective: a normalization of geographic differences in the supply and demand for labor (Massey, Arango et al 1993). To a degree, this theory serves as a fine explanation for the initial migration waves in the early nineteen hundreds. Until the recession of 1973, France was a significant labor importing economy (Jennissen, 2003). However, Jennissen also identifies unemployment as an important reason for labor importers to reduce their activities in growing the immigrant labor base. During 2000-2013, a time in which the Algerian immigrant population nearly doubled, growing much faster than the total immigrant population, France's unemployment rates were high for the Western Europe region- peaking at 10.5% in 2013, nearing double that of Germany (5.1%) and Luxembourg (6.3%), and higher than neighbor Belgium (8.5%). In addition, Gmelch (1980) noted that in the seventies, most Algerian immigrants were performing unschooled labor, with two thirds of them working in building trades. This makes them sensitive to impact in this particular industry. Hence, neoclassical economic theory does not provide sufficient explanatory value to explain this continued migration flow.
We can enrich this approach further by including an anthropological view on the reasons for migration. Sayad, who studied Algerian immigration into France, identified three principles behind migration movements:
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"Before becoming an immigrant, one is always first an emigrant";
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"Migration is the product and expression of an historical relation of international domination";
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Migration has "requisite collective dissimulation and social duplicity".
(Bourdieu, Wacquant, 2000).
In this sense, we cannot see migration to Algeria as addressing a need from France- it is first and foremost, an emigration from Algeria, which carries with it the historical relationships between Algeria and France. In that sense, France in many ways is a logical point of migration for Algerians- colonization left French as one of the principal languages taught and used in Algeria, making the cultural shock less significant, and allowing for easier adjustment of migrants. This sense of "receiving country bias", also described by Castles (2010), is partially rooted in the fact that immigration is more frequently seen as a concern than emigration, especially as research work has historically been coordinated from the often richer, northern destination countries.
There are strong indications that the Algerian migrant community has built its own network, a "transnational social space", along the model proposed by Faist (2006). Faist describes four unique types:
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"Small groups", or kinship systems;
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"Issue networks";
"Transnational communities";
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"Transnational organizations".
Collyer (2003b) describes how social spaces originate from the idea of "chain migration", where migration between countries leads to increased migration between those countries. He quotes Bourdieu in stating that existing social capital provides significant encouragement and lowers the risk of new migration attempts. In his work, Collyer (2003b) notes several examples of Algerian citizens who came to Europe, and at least made an intermediate stop in France, often in Marseille, because family relations there permitted easier integration. Issue networks are also likely to develop, given the historically similar political systems between France and Algeria, especially for immigrants of older generations. A large number of more formal Algerian associations have also come to be, often operating across boundaries, as illustrated by various Algerian consulate web sites (Republique Algerienne Democratique, 2015).
Response by French decision-makers and citizens
Prior to delving into the Algerian situation, it is interesting to consider France's approach to migration studies. Amiraux and Simon (2006) note that migration studies have long not been considered a valid field of investigation in the French social sciences. They attest this to the republican model of integration, which "seeks to maintain the fiction of a universalist nation that has succeeded in overcoming ethnic and racial divisions".
However, there are indications that this approach is less than ideal. France has, in recent years, taken a reluctant approach to accepting more immigrants, including those that would immigrate legally. Samers (2003) argues that there are three reasons for this French public policy approach: its migration to a more "European" view on security, 'self-limited sovereignty' and an increased desire to control its own labor market. While the latter two are relatively clear, and impacted by any immigration flow, the first point is worthy of further review. Samers notes that under President Chirac, a combination of Islamic militant attacks in France and civil war in Algeria led to significant security concerns within the French media. This concern was particularly actual given the 1995 Paris Metro and RER bombings, which took the life of eight and for which responsibility was claimed by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which was predominantly active in Algeria at the time (Hafez, 2000).
It is also clear that there were significant limitations to the "normality of life" of an Algerian migrant residing in France. Collyer (2003a) quotes Adli, an engineer who studied in France and later moved to Britain: "I've never been asked for ID here in 7 years. In France I was stopped all the time, sometimes 7 or 8 times per day".
But there may also be a religious component. Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2010) performed an experiment by submitting three resumes to particular job postings. One with a typical African surname, a second one with a typical Muslim first name, and the third with a typical French first name. They saw markedly less responses to the resume with a typical Muslim name, around 2.5 times less. This type of religious discrimination definitely also makes integration of immigrants from Algeria more difficult - 99% of its citizens is Muslim, predominantly Sunni.
French asylum policy seems to mimic these concerns, if not by design, then by influence. Collyer (2003), notes in a comparison between British and French immigration approaches, that by 1999, over 70 percent of Algerians in the UK were granted asylum, compared to only four percent in France.
In 2003 and 2006, the president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, implemented a new law on immigration control, which made immigration policy more restrictive, combined with more effort to establish proper integration, such as the funding of mosques, positive discrimination, and the ability for foreigners to vote in local elections. After the banlieue riots in 2005, the law was updated, resulting in more restrictive immigration, including requirements for sufficient financial means to support themselves and family members (Marthaler, 2008).
Return migration to Algeria
Return migration to Algeria is less well studied. King (1986) noted that after the recession in 1973-74, most return emigration consisted of a return "to retirement". However, he describes how the government initiated new programs to motivate returnees towards three industrial growth poles, including the capital Algiers.
However, Algeria has long had a standing policy that its migrants to France should return home, denouncing emigration "as a form of post-colonial dependence" (Fargues, 2006). However, Fargues notes it never deployed specific programs to that effect, due to its very high domestic unemployment rates.
Emigrants to France also contribute to the Algerian economy through financial means. In 2005, immigrants and binationals sent a total of 2,179,000 EUR in remittances to Algeria (World Bank, 2005). While a small number compared to Algeria's GDP for that year- 103.2 billion USD (World Bank, 2015), note that remittances are a fundamental part of economic policy issues, and contributes to regions in very different ways (Margolis et al 2013). They note that remittances decreased inequality in poor regions, but often less so in extremely poor regions, as in extremely poor households, the emigrant ends up being unable to send remittances, offsetting any economic gains. Their further investigation indicated that in many ways this is related to the replication of homeland social structures in France, which take precedence over the connections back home.
Where successful, remittances most likely contribute to the social spaces that encourage the continued emigration flow to France.
Conclusion
Migration flows from France to Algeria have been multi-faceted, since the colonial days in which Algeria was directly governed by France. Initially, migration was open in the sense of a single republic, later shifting towards typical labor immigration in the form of neoclassical economic theory. After a recession in France "closed the doors" to labor workers from Algeria, much immigration was "forced" due to safety concerns and violence in Algeria, as well as driven by family reunions.
However, it is clear that Algerian migration patterns to France are concerning to both policymakers and French citizens, for a number of concerns, one of which being safety and security. The existence and success of transnational networks make it unlikely that the flow of immigration will cease, and new methods of integration are much needed to address some of the social concerns raised throughout the paper.
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